Self-Interest, Sympathy And The Origin Of Endowments by Cherry, Todd & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
Self-Interest, Sympathy And The Origin Of Endowments 
By: Todd L. Cherry & Jason F. Shogren
Abstract
We explore whether the recent laboratory findings that suggest the origin of 
endowment matters in simple bargaining games are actually due to contextual 
shifts of relative effort and deservingness. Results support previous findings of 
endowment origin yielding more self-interested behavior.
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In response, Cherry et al. (2002) extended the Anonymous Dictato
game to create an institutional context in which nearly all dictato
were hardnosed rational game-theorists—9.5 of every 10 dictato
gave nothing to their subordinates. Their straightforward adjustmen
to the experimental design had dictators make offers based on earne
endowments rather than windfall endowments.2 Legitimizing mone
with effort, along with social isolation, appears to close the gap b
tween observation and standard game theory.3
But dictators earning the endowments inherently alters th
symmetry of effort and possibly the perceived relative deservingnes
of the players, which previous work argues may influence dictato
offers (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Charness and Rabin, 2002). So on
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their experiments, dictators that earned their endowment offered nothing to their 
subordinates in all cases.
3 This finding follows previous work that indicated effort and deservingness matter
in simple bargaining games; see for example Kahneman et al. (1986), Shogren (1989),
Ruffle (1998) and Konow (2000).
Table 1
Summary statistics
Windfall endowment Earned endowment
No opportunity Neutral Opted out of opportunity No opportunity Neutral Opted out of opportunity
Mean offer
Endow=$10 $3.47 $2.41 $1.12 $2.41 $0.77 $0.00
(34.7%) (24.1%) (11.1%) (24.1%) (7.7%) (0.0%)
Endow=$20 $7.18 $6.18 $2.41 $6.65 $1.00 $0.12
(35.9%) (30.9%) (12.1%) (33.2%) (5.0%) (0.6%)
Positive offers
Endow=$10 14 12 8 12 5 0
(88.2%) (70.6%) (47.1%) (79.4%) (26.5%) (0.0%)
Endow=$20 16 14 7 15 4 2
(88.2%) (82.45%) (41.2%) (79.4%) (26.5%) (11.8%)
Equal splits
Endow=$10 7 3 1 4 1 0
(35.3%) (17.7%) (5.9%) (23.5%) (2.9%) (0.0%)
Endow=$20 5 4 2 4 0 0
(35.3%) (23.5%) (5.9%) (23.5%) (2.9%) (0.0%)
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the percentages of total endowment or total bargains.reported earn endowment effect. Dictators can be sympathetic, but
less so with earned money.
2. The experiment
The basic experimental design follows previous work (Oxoby and
Spraggon, 2008 and Cherry et al., 2002).4 When recruited, subjects
were assigned to group A or B, with each group meeting in separate
rooms at separate times. The two groups did not have any contact
before, during, or after the session. Subjects were randomly matched
across groups to form bargaining pairs. Instructions for the dictator
game were read aloud to both groups, and all questions were
addressed. Person Awas the first mover (i.e., the dictator) and dictated
a split of his or her endowment with Person B (i.e., the recipient).
Administrators delivered the offers to recipients. All bargains were
one-shot, and players had complete information. Final earnings were
determined, and subjects departed individually with cash payment.
Our experiment follows a 2×3 design that varies two factors of the
basic framework: endowment origin; (1) earned or (2) windfall, and
recipient opportunity; (a) had no opportunity to earn or receive any
money, (b) had an opportunity, but opted out, or (c) neutral—the classic
treatment in which no information is disclosed about recipient's
opportunity.5 Two hundred and eight students from the under-
graduate student body at Appalachian State University participated
in the six sessions, each session having 34 independent bargaining
pairs.6
2.1. Endowment
In the earned endowment treatments, dictators earned money
by answering 17 questions taken from the Graduate Management
Admissions Test (GMAT). We ranked people based on the number of
correct answers; ties were broken by the amount of time taken to
answer the questions. Those performing in the top half of the group
earned $20, while those in the bottom half earned $10. Dictators acted
over their earnings in the bargain.4 The protocol for subject anonymity follows Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), which is a
weaker form of the double-blind protocol demonstrated in Hoffman et al. (1996) and
Cherry et al. (2002).
5 Our primary focus is on the no opportunity versus opted out of opportunity
conditions. But additional categories of deservingness exist and are worth exploring in
future research, e.g., recipient who was given an opportunity to earn wealth and
actually took the opportunity.
6 Sessions followed a written protocol to ensure consistency.The windfall treatments followed the standard protocol of the
experimenter allocating money to the dictators. To mimic the earned
endowment treatment, half of the dictators were randomly selected to
receive $10, with the other half receiving $20. Dictators subsequently
acted over their allocated endowments in the bargain.7
2.2. Knowledge of recipient opportunity
We considered three contextual variations of recipient oppor-
tunities to earn or receive endowments themselves: no opportunity,
opted out of opportunity, and neutral. In the no opportunity treat-
ment, dictators were informed the recipient in Room B had no
opportunity to earn or receive money. The recipient only received
what the dictator offered. In the opted out of opportunity treat-
ment, dictators knew recipients had an opportunity to earn or
receive money, but choose not to participate. Dictators were ran-
domly assigned to people that were recruited for the experiment
but chose not to participate. Therefore, unlike other treatments,
recipients in the ‘opted out’ treatment were not in Room B and
received their payoffs (if any) at a later date.8 The neutral treatment
did not provide the dictators any information about the recipient's
opportunity to earn or receive money—neither having nor not hav-
ing an opportunity.
3. Experimental results
Table 1 reports the aggregate results by treatment and endow-
ment level. Results confirm previous reports that dictators make
significantly lower offers when acting over earned rather than wind-
fall endowment (e.g., Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Cherry et al., 2002).
Across the treatments, dictators acting over earned endowments of-
fered less than those acting over windfall endowments in all cases. In
the low endowment bargains, dictators that earned their endowment
offered $1.06 (31%) less in the no opportunity treatment, $1.64 (68%)
less in the neutral treatment, and $1.12 (100%) less in the opted out
treatment. Dictators that earned high endowments offered $0.53 (7%)7 The selection of high and low endowment dictators in the earned and windfall
treatments differ (exam score versus random), which may raise questions of sample
selection, but previous research using this selection method has found this is not a
significant concern.
8 The instructions stated the recipient “decided not to participate” in the session.
Instructions are available upon request.
Table 2
Estimates of treatment effects
Basic model Expanded model
Constant 0.2211⁎⁎⁎ 0.2618⁎⁎⁎
(9.16) (9.30)
No opportunity 0.1507⁎⁎⁎ 0.0779⁎⁎
(5.70) (2.12)
Opted out −0.1096⁎⁎⁎ −0.1588⁎⁎⁎
(−4.14) (−4.31)
$20 endowment 0.0265 0.0265
(1.23) (1.24)
Earned −0.1304⁎⁎⁎ −0.2118⁎⁎⁎
(−6.04) (−5.75)
Earned⁎no opportunity – 0.1456⁎⁎⁎
(2.79)
Earned⁎opted out – 0.0985⁎
(1.89)
F
(p-value)
33.90 24.65
(0.0000) (0.0000)
N 204 204
Notes: Dependent variable is the percent of endowment offered.
t-statistics reported in parentheses unless noted otherwise.
⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎ indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.less in the no opportunity treatment, $5.18 (84%) in the neutral
treatment, and $2.29 (95%) less in the opted out treatment.9
Aggregate numbers indicate that dictators acting over earned
endowments adhered closely to the theoretically predicted behavior
of zero offers in the neutral and opted out treatments, but even with
an earned endowment, they exhibit sympathy to subordinates in the
no opportunity treatment. The other measures reported in Table 1
further illustrate these findings—the number of positive offers and
equal splits was lower in all cases when dictators acted over earned
endowments rather than windfall endowments, but less so in the no
opportunity treatment.
The aggregate numbers also indicate recipient opportunity mat-
ters, regardless of the endowment origin. Whether the endowment
was earned or not, dictators offered more to recipients that had no
opportunity to earn or receive money, and offered less to those that
opted out of opportunities. There were also more positive offers, more
equal splits, and higher average offers when recipients had no op-
portunity, and the converse was true when recipients opted out of
opportunities. This result is consistent with previous work showing
dictators acting over allocated endowments offer more to charities
and those living in poverty (Brañas-Garza, 2006; Eckel and Grossman,
1996), but herein we show such contextual influences are robust
across earned and windfall endowments. Interestingly, the numbers
reveal a larger difference between earned and windfall offers in the
neutral treatment relative to the other treatments. This raises ques-
tions for future research concerning the beliefs of dictators in the
absence of recipient information, and whether the lack of context
leads to self-serving biases or presumptions that recipients are like
them (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).
We reinforce these preliminary aggregate observations by under-
taking an individual-level conditional analysis with the following
model:
Oi ¼ aþ /Oppi þ xEarni þ hEndowi þ wEarn4Oppi þ ei; ð1Þ
where Oi is the offer by the ith dictator as a percent of her endowment,
Oppi is a vector of binary variables signifying the opportunity of the
ith dictator's recipient (neutral omitted), Earni is a single dichotomous
variable that equals 1 if the ith dictator earned her endowment,
0 otherwise; Endowi is a dichotomous variable indicating the ith9 We note that, as a reviewer points out, since endowments were earned via a quiz,
there is a possibility that the process of earning wealth confounds with the wealth
being earned.dictator's endowment level (1 if $20, 0 otherwise); Earn⁎Oppi is a
vector of interaction variables that capture the relative impact of an
endowment being earned across recipient opportunities; α is the
estimated intercept, and εi is the error term. We estimate a basic and
full model, which differ by the inclusion of the interaction variables.
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates and confirms our initial
impressions. Both the origin of endowment and recipient opportuni-
ty matters. Estimates across both the basic and full models show
dictators bargaining with an earned endowment offered significant-
ly less money than those acting over allocated money—even when
controlling for recipient opportunity. Results therefore indicate the
observed earned endowment effect is not just an artifact of contextual
nuances; rather it arises because endowments are earned rather than
allocated.
Results also indicate dictators offered significantly more to re-
cipients that had no opportunity to earn or receive money relative to
the neutral baseline, and they offered less to recipients that opted out
of an opportunity. The robustness of this result is illustrated by esti-
mated coefficients of the expanded model, which reveals sympathetic
offers arose regardless of the endowment origin.10
4. Conclusions
Recent bargaining experiments draw upon the notion of mental
accounting to explore whether endowment origin matters in simple
bargaining games (Thaler, 1990; Thaler, 1999). Results show that dic-
tators acting over money they earned, rather than money they were
allocated, adhered more closely to standard game theoretic predic-
tions (Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008 and Cherry et al., 2002). Dictators
earning endowments however also changes the relative effort within
the bargain and potentially the relative perceived deservingness of the
players. Some may wonder whether the reported earned endowment
effect is due to changes in relative deservingness, not legitimizing the
endowment. Results herein suggest this is not the case.
We find, as expected, recipient opportunity matters—dictators
offered more to recipients that had no opportunity to earn or receive
money, and less to those that opted out of such an opportunity. But
we also find this did not explain away the earned endowment effect.
We find, regardless of recipient opportunity, dictators offered sig-
nificantly less when acting over earned endowments than windfall
endowments. While dictators that earned their endowment exhib-
ited hardnosed behavior in most cases, they did show sympathy to
subordinates that had no opportunity; though significantly less with
earned money.
In his plenary lecture at the 2007 Economic Science Association
Meetings in Rome, Vernon Smith highlighted the implication of the
earned endowment effect. In thinking about the next big questions in
experimental economics, he wondered whether legitimizing endow-
ments with effort would change other findings as well. We know a lot
about how people spend other people's money in experiments;
perhaps we should continue initial efforts to learn more about how
they spend their own money (e.g., Clark, 2002; Cherry et al., 2005).
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